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DELIVERY SUNDAY

BY SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., M0NTANA)
AT THE
LAW CENTER COMMENCEMENT EXERCISES
GE0RGETOWN UNIVERSITY
WASHINGT N, D. C.
SUNDAY, MAY 25, 1975
5:00 P. M., E. S. T.

AFTER VIET NAM:

The

u. s.

cl~ss

A TIME FOR REASSESSMENT

of 1975 is the first to

disengagP-ment frnm Indochina.

gr~duate

after the

This commencement alan

marks the beginning of the fourth decade since World War II.
Some here,

t~day,

in the recent war.
World War II.

among the graduates were active participants
Among the parents, many played a part in

It ie something of

~

confP-esion of my age to

note that I was involved in World War I.

I hasten to add,

however, that it was at the very end nf that conflict.
morP, I

WA.S

An

urldPr-f!tg"d

seaman

tn

Further-

the N.g,vy at the time.
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My remarks will be directed to what we have in common
as different generations of Americans.

Whatever we may not

have, we have the United States in common and at a most difficult moment in the nation's history.
passing through the aest of times.

Clearly, we are not
Clearly, this is not

freedom's finest hour.
Do not look to me, however, to condemn an older
generation for the present state of affairs.
the nation's plight on the young.

Nor will I blame

Young people did not make

the situation in which, together, we find ourselves; they have
not yet had that opportunity.

As for older generations, it is

or to correct a few of the accumulated mistakes which they
inherited when they were younger.

So, I will not lead this commencement in a search for
scapegoats.

Let me try, instead, to set forth where I think

we are, how we have arrived at this point, and where we

~ay
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hope to go from here , nota.• ly in our relations with the reRt
of the world .
These questions cannot
ontext of the
that is now
i t stay

experienc~

clos~d

in Indochina .

~ een ,

hlock to the nation's future .
has

diR~ppeRred

and

exp~ctations .

considered except in the
Viet Nam is a

~ook

and, may I add , it is my fer vent hope that

I t has

clos~d .

~e

this long and tragic war , a road It has been a funnel into which

a massive chunk of the nation ' s ideals , energies

Although the book is closed on Viet Nam, it is essential thRt we not forget its costs .
Some readil y Rpparent and some

They were many and great .

o~scure .

For these remarks,

today, it is hufficient to note only that fifty- five thousand
Americans died in the WRr and I hope the l ast group, in the
MRyRgUPZ affair .

These young men were cut out of l ife Rt an

ge not much differPnt from that of thi s graduat i ng class .
•rt~e

w('n.u.dPd 1n Jr ..dn~"' l d n.c:t

w~r c

t l ..r ~ P.

1 undr ed t houRa.nd .

One

l

- 4 hundred fifty billion dollars or more in public funds were
spent to pursue the war.

Before the final reckoning (all the

•ills will not be paid until well into the next

century)~

the

cost undoubtedly will have doubled and doubled again.
In this

nation~

a large segment of our strength and

resources was diverted to support the misbegotten venture.
As a result, much of what needed doing at home by government
was not done or not done very well,

In the name of security

against vague threats from Southeast

Asia~

the inner security

of the nation was neglected for almost a decade,
The war left thP- nation's economy in worse straits
than at any time since the Great Depression,
its price in the present inflation-depression.
sputteringa now and then hut
of recovery.

ther~

We are paying
There are

are as yet no real signs

On the contrary, over eight million people remain

unemployed, with the impact of this figure felt especially
among ymmg

Am~rlcsus

a.nd :ln the great metropolitan centers.

- 6 energy.

Yet few, if any, answers are being found to the

questions.

So far there is little to show in the way of

results.
Our present economic problems are duplicated abroad
in many of the countries with whom, since the end of World
War II, we have had

the · ~losest

Western Europe and Japan.

connections, in particular,

They have been military allies and

we are associated with them in a variety of mutually advantageous economic arrangements.

The plight of some of these

countries, Italy and the United Kingdom, for example, is grave.
Problems of the kind I have mentioned have long cried
out for concentrated public attention.

They plead for an in-

jection of young energy and approaches, fresh intellectual
resources and a new dedication in all aspects of the leadership of this nation.

That it has not been forthcoming, in my

judgment, is due in no small part to the
notably, to Southeast Asia

1~the

div~rsions

past decade.

a•road and,

- 7 Whatever may have led us into the conflict in that
region, it is now clear that the involvement hit us where it
hurt most -- in the nation's inner unity .

The war opened with

a Presidential call for support of the Commander- in- Chief; it
was met by a patriotic affirmation of national unity .
th~

Before

war was over, however , we went through deeper divisions

than any since the Civil War .
know at the out ..~et .

We know now what we did not

The involvement did not serve

th~

inter -

ests of th s na '-ion or th-3 Viet"lf.mer· ~, Cu.r11bodian and Laotian
people .

That is the b itt f' r r8 :::lity of th.i.G frustrating exper-

ience .
We pursued a well- intentioned but impossihle dream .
In its pursuit, the lands and penplea of Indochina were torn
and hattered almost heyond recognition .

While young Americans

died in the tens of thousands , Vietnamese , Cambodians

~d

LaotirulA-- mPn, women and children-- died in the millions .
simple r JC' ~ cu lt,n·PA--V Jet Nam,

r.~mbod i

Three

a aud La0s- -were over-

- 8 whelmed hy the technology of modern warfare.

Millions fled

the villages, the hill-towns and the paddy fields.to escape
the bombs and crossfire.

They huddled as refugees in the

cities, there to live in one way or another--including the
widespread trafficking in drugs--off the troops.

The swollen

urban populations were fed, in major part, by imported food
paid for by

u. s.

aid programs.

Ironically, rice had to le

sent from this nation to what is one of the richest rice surplus areas of the world.

While we \'Jere exporting food to

Indochina, shortages at home pushed prices, sky-high, to
Americans.
Why?

To what end?

Now that recollections of the war are

f~et

receding

into history, it is important to ask ourselves these questions.
We must ask ourselves what impelled us into this ill-fated
enterpris~?

I raise the matter, not to open old wounos.

Nor

do I raise it to put the finger of blame on particular indivi-

- 9 duals .

There is blame enough to spare for all concPr nen--for

a succession of Presidents , a succession of Congresses , a
continuum of military and civilian bureaucrats .
there is

hl~e

In the Pnd ,

enough for all of us .

I raise ther questions because they must he ruised .
Answers must he sought to them if the events of the past few
WPeks in Indochina are to he not merely a depressing end to a
long and bleak chapter in this nation ' s hiRtory hut also a new
and

hop~ful heg~r~ing .

We have , in short) an obligation to clar ify what we
wer~

about in Viet Nam for so many y ears .

Th~t

is a way of

keeping faith with the Americans whom we sent to Indochina and
who have not come back.

That is an obligation which is owed

to living generations and to the future citizens of this nation .
Unless the questions are resolved in all honesty , we will have
le~=trned

nothillg

Rn.d this nation 1 A historjc purpose will have

emergpd under the pPrrruu.ent cloud of the war .

On

th ~

other
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hand, if an understanding of the tragic experience assures
that this is, indeed, the last Viet Nam, then the sacrifices
which have been exacted will be not without meaning.
It is pointless, may I reiterate, to put the finger
of responsibility on one President or another, on one party
or the other, on the Defense Department the State Department
or some other.

We are all involved.

There is no evading a

national responsibility.
Viet Nam did not spring suddenly out of partisan
politics.

Nor did it begin just a few years ago, in 1969,

1966, 1964 or even 1961.

In my judgment, the present involve-

ment is a culmination of a foreign policy which was born before
most of the members of this graduating class.
Parents here, today, will remember a great war and
its aftermath over a quarter of a century ago.

They will

remember a military power assembled by a united people, deployed all over the globe and welcomed by the oppressed everywhere in the world.

It was an immense power which overwhelmed

a tyranny in Europe and another in Asia.

- ll -

After an atomic-sealed victory over Japan, this nation
moved into the post-World War II era, intact, powerful and
dynamic.

In contrast, vast areas of the world lay in ruins

around us, hungry, exhausted and bankrupt.

The international

leadership of the United States was sought in these circumstances hy friend and enemy even as it came to be opposed by
the Soviet Union .

As we saw it, then, this nation's economic

dynamism was the only hope for what began to be called the
"free world."

As we saw it, too, this nation's military

supremacy, including an atomic monopoly, was the principal
bulwark against the aggressive spread of what was soon termed
"monolithic Communism . "

The term was applied to our erstwhile

ally, the Soviet Union, and all nations and political movements
which fell within what was believed to be the permanent orbit
of -1oscow.
TherP hegan an era of foreign policy based on those
prF>miSE'R.

TenR of billions 0f dollars of materials,

s~rvices

- 12 -

and credits poured out of the United States into other countries,
often to help them to recover and maintain free systems, more
often, to keep them from "going communist."

Aid went to Western

Europe, to Asia, to Latin America and eventually, to Africa.
In the name of the United Nations, a war was fought
and financed by this country to hold back communism in Korea.
We led the United Nations into a boycott of the revolutionary
Chinese People's Republic which was held at the time to he in
Moscow's orbit.
sive time of U.

Tens of thousands of man-hours of the expen-

s.

government diplomats, agents and employees

were invested in the effort to exclude the Peking government
from the world community, if not to bring it down altogether.
Multiple alliances were built which wove us into a common NATO
defense of Western Europe and linked us in some sort of defense
arrangements with forty nations or more around the globe.
Hundreds of thousands of Americans in uniform went abroad,
into military garrisons and bases in Europe and Japan and

- 13 elsewhere.

Tens of billions of dollars worth 0f construction,

equipment and weapons and nuclear warheads went with them .
These policies were devised largely in the name of
national security and world peace .

They were called, accurately,

bipartisan and were described less accurately as a mutual
security program.

The fact is that the policies, as late as

the Innochina involvement, were largely a one-sided effort of
the United States .

They rested on the readiness of this

nation to carry the preponderant burdens of cost and, in the
last analysis, notably as in the case of Korea, the Dominican
Republic and Indochina, the weight of direct U. S . military
operations .
For years, there was little reason to question these
policies .

CongrP.ss was predisposed by the experience of World

War II to accept the leadership of the President .

We were in

a period of Go-called cold war with Soviet and Chinese communism.
By the same token,

alJie~

nations had no choice but to accept

- 14 the leadership of the United States which alone had the
capacity to sustain this postwar system.
To be sure, there were flaws in the structure even
though they were not readily visible in the exhuberance of the
times.

In the first place, the security system relied so

heavily on military power to maintain peace and, particularly,
on

u. s.

military power that an undue burden of responsibility

was consigned to the Armed Services even as an excessive drain
was attached to the national economy.

A zeal for a new-found

internationalism, moreover, led us to label virtually everything that we did abroad with that word and led us beyond
essential national needs and humanitarian considerations, into
an incautious involvement in almost every area of the world
either in the name of "fighting Communism" or "promoting
progress" or "insuring the nation's security."

This worldwide

projection of U. S. influence involved heavy expenditures of
the people's money for all kinds of aid-programs and the creation of elaborate U. S. official establishments abroad.

- 15 r-t0reover, it prompted us to take on, as allies, a numher of
governments who were dependents in all but name and with
highly dubious roots of acceptance among their own people.
The great vitality of the postwar economy of this nation also
creatPd an erroneous belief in its inexhaustibility.

Even as

late as the onset of the Viet Namese War, we proceeded as though
the nation could

hav~

not only guns and butter but would also

be able to pay for fat and

~rimmings.

We pursued these policies, flaws and all, with little
change for many years.

We pursued them, however, in a world

which was changing greatly.
to an end.

The nation's atomic monopoly came

The myth of "monolithic Communism" disappeared in

num rous political shifts among the Eastern Europeans and in
the vast upheaval in the Chinese- Soviet relationship.

Newly

independent stRtes appeared in the underdeveloped areas, as
classic colonialism was reduced to an historic

r~lic.

recovered Alld wPnt far beyond recovery to new heights

Europe
of

- 16 well-being.

New economic dynamisms emerged, notably in Germany

and Japan, even as our own economy showed signs of overwork.
It was in these changed circumstances that we became
involved in Indochina.

We became involved for what had long

been accepted as highly worthwhile ends.

We became involved

in the name of resisting "aggressive Communism," in the name
of "national security, 11 in the name of

11

safeguarding inter-

national peace,'' and in the name of "honoring commitments" to
what were weak and dependent governments.
We went into Viet Nam, in short, on the wheels of the
same policy and for many of the same reasons that we had gone
into Korea a decade and a half earlier, only this time without
even the modicum of international sanction which had, in the
Korean situation, been supplied by the United Nations .

We did

so almost as an habituated response, with far less understanding
of the actual situation ln JndoC'hina and unmindful of the changes
which l1ad taken place in this nation, in Asia and in the world.

- 17 I think it is now widely understood that Viet Nam
w~s

a mistake, a tragic mistake .
To have persisted in it in the closing days of the

sud den collapse of the synthetic military government which
existed in Saigon at the time would have been to do violence
to the welfare of the nation and to add to the sur feit of
violence which had already been visited on the Indochinese
peninsula .

In my judgment , the determination of Congress to

face up to and to act on that reality by refusing to supply
a further billion dollars in military aid was a singular service
to this nation and to the people of Indochina .

We had armed,

trained , financed and fought for dubious governments in Viet Nam
and Cambodia .

We had done our share-- far more than our share --

to inject them with the elements of survival .

What last ditch

effort would have been likely to do anything more?
In writing an end to the involvement in Indochina , I
believe Congress also underscored the beginning of a new era
ju

thP.

nRt.inn'

s int.Prwtt:lmnl r 1A.tions .

MistA.kes have been

- 18 made during the past thirty years in the conduct of these
relations and, certainly, Indochina was the last and greatest.
Do not think for a moment, however, that the experience of
these three decades was all a mistake.

Much that was done

had to be done, in the enduring interests of this nation and
the world.

Much that is being done now needs still to be done.

A vast web of trade and cultural relationships, for
example, has been woven with the rest of the world.

It has

served for many years to enhance the lives of hundreds of
millions of people.

By the same token, a sudden sundering of

this web could bring upheavals and conflicts of a most disastrous kind.

We have also begun to perceive in these twenty-

five years, I believe, the dimensions of the problem of maintaining permanent peace.

That perception may make us more aware

of our essential national limitations as well as our vast
national potential.

In the process, we may gain greater aware-

ness of the significance of human interdependency and mutual
concern if the world is ever to know stability. Peace cannot be
maintai ned by Uni ted States power alone.

- 19 It would compound the tragedy if, in the bitter aftermath of Indochina, we were to turn our backs on this advance.
It would be a step backward if we were to veer from what hecame
an excessive, one might say, an obsessive international involvement to an extreme of disinvolvement.
That danger has been intensified, it seems to me, not only in
the post-Indochina atmosphere of disillusionment but becRuse
we are in the midst of a serious economic situation at home.
I hope it will be recognized, therefore, that it is
possible to withdraw from Indochina without seceding from the
world.

If we make that distinction--and I am confident that

the people of this nation and their representatives in Congress
will make it--than it should be possible to withdraw militarily
not only from Indochina but from the entire Southeast Asian
mainland, including Thailand, withnut severing normal internation~l

contact with that region and certainly withnut

aPandnning our vital interests in what transpires on the
periphery of the Asian mainland.
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Similarly, we should be able, in time, to reduce
sharply and re-order the United Stated deployment of over
half a million armed forces and dependents in Western Europe
three decades after World War II without forsaking the essential
mutual pledges of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance.
supported and urged such reductions for a decade.

I have

The events

in Indochina in no way alter my view that one or two divisions
of U.

s.

forces stationed in Europe commits the United States

no less irrevocably than five.

Timing of reductions is another

matter but I can only say that the sooner they begin, the more
gradual and less dislocative will they be.
We must, too, in the Congress exercise a firm and
discriminating control over the enormous expenditures which are
made in the name of national defense and, at the same time,
still provide adequately for the security of the nation.
should find it

feasib~to

We

curb the carelessness, costliness

and cosiness which has filtered into the Armed Forces system,
notably in contracting with defense industries, without

- 21 -

demeaning and discouraging the millions of dedicated men and
women who wear the uniform .

\ole

should be capable of shutting

down obsolescent and over - extended aid programs without losing
a human compassion for the other people with whom we share the
earth.
If these adjustments are to be made effectively, it
seems to me that they must be accompanied by new and vigorous
efforts of American diplomacy .

These efforts should be aimed

at securing agreements among nations which would make inter national stability more dependent on mutual undertakings and
less on the unilateral commitment of the military power of
this or any other nation .

Such agreements in the Far Pacific,

for example, would have to involve not only the United States
and Japan, but also the People 1 s Republic of China, the Soviet
Union, the Philippines and other nations .

Communist or not,

there is a sufficient pool of common interests in preserving
peace and developing tradP among these Asian and Pacific nations
to make the search for new understandings more thA.n a quixotic
venture .

- 22 -

May I say that I find it most helpful in this respect
that President Nixon initiated official contact with the Chinese
People's Republic and that the bi-lateral ties of Japan and the
Philippines with tl•e
the enlarging
natio~ s.

region~l

United States
are being grGdually ab::wrbed in

I

and international contacts of these

I am hopeful that they will soon be joined by the

Republic of South Korea which remains an area of concern.

I

am hopeful, too, that steps will be initiated by the Chinese on
Taiwan and the Chinese on the Mainland, looking to the reunification of what is one China.

The security of the Western

Pacific must come to rest far more heavily in the future on
mutual restraint, normal relations and interdependence among
the nations of that region and less on the military power of
the United States .
In regard to Europe, an updated approach to the relationship would presuppose, it seems to me, a substantial shift
away from dependency on NATO and the Warsaw

Pac ~ and

a greater

effort to reach agreements which will continue to expand and

- 23 -

to consolidate constructive ties hetween East and West Europe .
In the talks between the two segments which are now taking
place, it might be helpful if the Soviet Union and this nation
were to s t ,nd to the side and let the lead pass to smaller
EuropPan states on both sides .
The efforts of the Soviet Union and the United States
might well be concentrated , instead , on disarmament, reductions
of their forces in Europe, and the control of nuclear weapons
whichta~e

been pursued for so many years.

In this connection,

some risks for peace are clearly indicated if we are to reduce
the ever - present and catastrophic risk of the collapse of human
civilization that is inherent in international nuclear anarchy .
To be sure, the nuclear test ban treaty, the SALT agreement,
and other peripheral undertakings represent significant advances
but they provide far from sufficient protection against the
threat of nuclear destruction which from second to second hangs
over all 0f us .

- 24 -

As for the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, it is,
in my judgment, unrealistic for those who already possess
nuclear weapons to ask other great states capable of producing
them to refrain from doing so indefinitely unless--and I stress
the word unless--such possessing states are themselves prepared
to show the way in reducing and ending the nuclear threat.

It

is not enough for them merely to put ceilings on their already
excessive nuclear arsenals.
on this question.

The need is to move in new ways

In the current talks, it seems to me that

the nuclear powers might well consider adding to the Treaty on
non-proliferation a fixed time span, perhaps ten years, within
which they would pledge mutual reductions of stockpiles and
progress towards banning--in the manner of poison gas- - or in the
control of usage of nuclear weapons by means of generally
acceptable international mechanisms.

Whether the United Nations

can be reconstituted to play a significant role in this process,
I do not know, but some international authority, it seems to
me, must be involved.

In any event, unless some tangible

- 25 progress of this kind is made, it is not likely that states
capable of producing nuclear weapons are going to remain for
long outside the inner circle of nuclear

powe~

in international

relations .
If I may sum up, then, the need for the era ahead, as
I

SP-e

it, will he to get away from the excesses of an indis -

criminate and, in many respects, increasingly disillusioning
and isolated internationalism which has characterized our
policies for the past two or three decades .

\ole !IIl"t

try to

recast our relations with others to the end that they are
multilateral and mutual in substance as well as in name .
Insofar as the United States is concerned, this
transition and development of policy must derive from Presidential leadership but it must not derive from Executive fiat .
If it is to find firm roots in our nation, any formulation of
U. S. policy must depend on

~

concerted pffort in which the

President is joined hy the Senate and the Congress, with P.ach
re~pP.ctful

nf the Constitutional sensibilities of the other .

- 26 It will depend on the many private universities and other
sources of enlightenment in the nation.

It will depend on a

government which can be trusted by an informed people because
it is credible in what it says and does and because it is alert
and responsive to their needs and to the needs of the nation.
You who graduate, today, and your counterparts throughout the nation, loom large in what may be anticipated during
the decades ahead.

With the vote, you are in a position to

make your weight felt in· the conduct of the government.

You

have such wisdom and training as education can provide.

Those

are highly important assets for your coming role in joining in
shaping the nation's future.

Beyond it, however, there is the

part which the younger generation will have played in ending
the tragedy of the involvement in Indochina.

I, for one, of

an older generation will applaud and thank you if you help to
see to it that tragedies of that kind are not repeated.

To

move beyond Viet Nam into a future of world understanding and

- 27 -

peace will devolve heavily on you .

To open a new era of

constructive cooperation with the rest of the human race, to
act with compassion and with high purpose for the welfare of
the people of this nation

~d

the world, that is your oppor -

tuni ty, you who are the ''new hands" of tomorrow .
life which lies ahead .

It is your nation .

May you make the most of them all .

It is your

It is your world .

